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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of hospital conversions between For-Profit and 
Not-For-Profit forms on quality of medical care. The sample includes Medicare patients 
treated in California’s private hospitals from 1990 to 1998 for Acute Myocardial 
Infarction and Congestive Heart Failure. The results suggest that converted hospitals have 
experienced quality changes before conversion, which may bias the estimated effects. 
Both conversions are found to have some adverse consequences regarding quality. 
Hospitals that converted to FP form show an increase in AMI mortality rates, while those 
converted to NFP status indicate an increase in CHF mortality and re-admission rates of 
AMI patients.  
 
JEL classification: L31; I18; I11 
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1. Introduction 
Recent conversions of not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals to for-profit (FP) 
status have raised public concerns about possible detrimental effects on quality of 
care (c.f. Goddeeris and Weisbrod (1998), Kuttner (1996a-b) and Ho and 
Hamilton (2000)). A common perception is that NFP institutions are committed to 
providing quality care regardless of costs. In fact, following Arrow (1963) 
theoretical models often assume that providers choose the NFP form of 
organization in order to signal this high commitment to quality (c.f. Frank and 
Sulkever (1994) and Glaeser and Schleifer (1998)).  
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Sloan (2000, 2001) and Baker et al. (2000) provide extensive surveys of the 
growing literature on the effects of NFP and FP status on the quality of care. 
However, few studies actually examine conversions of hospitals from one form to 
the other. Sloan (2002) and Shen (2002) are two exceptions. Sloan examines the 
effects of conversions on elderly patients admitted for stroke, hip fracture, 
coronary heart disease, congestive heart failure and pneumonia. He finds that 
conversions have no effect on the in-hospital mortality or on the proportion of 
uninsured patients. His results indicate however, that pneumonia patients treated in 
hospitals that converted to FP status experienced an increased rate of 
complications. Sloan argues that the failure to find a significant effect on the in-
hospital mortality may reflect shorter hospitalizations after conversion to FP 
status. Shen (2002) studies the effect of conversions on the health outcomes of 
heart attack patients. She finds that conversion to FP ownership has resulted in a 
significant increase in mortality probability. Both studies assume that the 
conversion effects on quality appear after conversion occurs. There is however, 
some evidence that conversions are usually preceded by financial difficulties 
(Sloan (2002) and Mark (1999)). Converted hospitals may therefore be subject to 
some gradual changes that potentially affect the quality of care prior to 
conversion. For instance, hospitals in financial distress may have started to 
deteriorate in quality long before conversion. In this case even if the conversion 
does slightly improve the situation, failure to control for the pre-conversion 
changes may lead to the conclusion that conversions resulted in lower quality. 
This paper examines the effects of conversions between FP and NFP forms 
in the California hospital market over the nine-year period between 1990 and 1998 
using models with hospital fixed effects. It differs from the previous literature in 
several aspects. First, there is no restrictive assumption on the conversion effects 
on quality.1  Secondly, the time-variations of quality before conversion are taken 
into account by controlling for the number of years before each type of 
conversion.  Finally, in contrast with Sloan (2002) and Shen (2002) who used a 
national sample of hospitals, I use a relatively uniform sample including 
California’s private short-term hospitals. The US states are quite heterogeneous 
regarding FP sector’s share in hospital markets, ranging from states with virtually 
no FP sector to markets dominated by FP hospitals. Since the presence of FP 
hospitals may affect the behavior of the NFP hospitals in the same area2, the NFP 
hospitals in different states may be significantly different from each other. 
California hospital market is characterized by a relatively large FP sector that has 
remained more or less constant over the study period.  
                                                          
1 Sloan (2002) assumes that conversion effects are symmetric. Shen (2002) on the other hand, assumes that 
the effect of conversion does not depend on the status prior to conversion. She assumes for instance that a 
conversion from public to NFP form has the same effect as a conversion from FP to NFP status. 
2 See Kessler and McClellan (2001) for some evidence. 
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One of the important difficulties in studying the ownership effects on 
hospital quality is the selection bias. Patients may be selected differently into a 
hospital before and after its conversion. For instance, an institution that changes 
from NFP to FP status may step up efforts to discourage the admission of 
unprofitable patients. In order to identify the direction and importance of the 
selection bias, I exploit the fact that different types of patients are selected in 
different ways. For example, heart attack patients are generally taken to the nearest 
hospital. Moreover, hospitals are required to treat patients in such an emergency 
situation regardless of their insurance coverage.3 On the other hand, patients with 
chronic conditions generally have time to plan their hospitalizations and their 
decisions may be influenced by many factors within the control of hospitals. These 
considerations suggest that the measured effects of conversion should be least 
masked by selection effects in patients with heart attacks (Acute Myocardial 
Infarction or AMI) and most subject to selection bias in patients with chronic 
conditions such as Congestive Heart Failure (CHF).4 A similar analysis is 
considered for patients admitted through the Emergency Room (ER), for whom 
the selection bias is attenuated because of time restrictions. 
The results generally indicate a low variation in conversion effects across 
different samples with different selection intensities, suggesting that as long as 
hospital fixed effects are controlled for, the selection bias does not seriously affect 
the results. The analyses reported in this paper indicate that conversions to both FP 
and NFP forms may have adverse effects on quality. While conversion to FP status 
is found to increase the in-hospital mortality of AMI patients, conversion to NFP 
form has increased the probabilities of mortality for CHF sample and re-admission 
among AMI patients. Controlling for the hospital stay indicates that the estimated 
differences in mortality are not driven by changes in hospital discharge/transfer 
policy.  
These results suggest that health outcomes in different diagnoses, even 
though similar in nature, may represent different dimensions of hospital quality. 
Moreover, the evidence is generally against the hypothesis that a particular 
ownership status represents a relatively high level of quality, suggesting that the 
observed changes after conversions are not directly resulted from institutional 
form. My findings also suggest that hospitals that convert from one status to 
another may be subject to certain changes prior to conversion.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews some of the 
previous literature. A description of the data and the adopted measures of quality 
is given in section 3. Section 4 explains the econometric methodology and 
                                                          
3 Although many hospitals violate these requirements, there is no significant difference in propensity to 
violate between FP and NFP hospitals in California (Blalock and Wolfe, 2001). 
4 Obviously noting that the two diagnoses are quite similar regarding the variety of treatment methods and 
other aspects of quality of care. 
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discusses potential sources of bias. Section 5 provides the results and section 6 
concludes the paper. 
2. Background 
Between 1970 and 1995, 330 of 5,000 NFP hospitals (about 7%) converted 
to FP type (Cutler and Horwitz, 2000). These conversions accelerated in the mid-
90’s. For example, 58 conversions occurred in 1995, up from 34 in 1994 (Kuttner, 
1996a). These developments have spurred a large literature on the effects of FP 
and NFP status on quality of care, but the results are far from conclusive largely 
because of the difficulty of controlling adequately for patient selection. As Kessler 
and McClellan (2001) suggest, more productive hospitals may attract sicker 
patients. Geweke et al. (2001) provide some evidence that patients with higher 
unobserved severity are more likely to be hospitalized in high quality institutions.  
Studies such as Gowrisankaran and Town (1999), Ettner and Hermann 
(2001) and McClellan et al. (1994) suggest that many patients choose the closest 
hospital, but this does not mean that FP status can be treated as exogenous 
determinant of mortality because FP hospitals are more likely to locate in areas 
with better insured patients, for example in areas with high proportion of Medicare 
patients (Norton and Staiger, 1994). McClellan and Staiger (2000) found that NFP 
hospitals have slightly lower mortality rates in a sample of elderly AMI patients, 
but reported that the estimated effects fell by almost half when county fixed 
effects were included in the model. Sloan (2002) cites these results and concludes 
that FP hospitals tend to be located in areas with higher mortality rates.  
Kessler and McClellan (2001) found that although the in-hospital mortality 
and the probability of readmission are on average lower in NFP hospitals, the 
presence of FP hospitals in the same area reduces expenditures at NFP hospitals 
without affecting health outcomes in these hospitals. These spillovers are 
suggestive of a market in which FP hospitals are more efficient than NFP 
hospitals. Using a national sample of hospitals Shen (2002) reports a significant 
increase in mortality of AMI Medicare patients after a conversion to FP status. 
The literature generally points to the importance of the effects of patient 
selection. There is some evidence that patients are likely to choose the closest 
hospitals. In this paper the hospital location is taken into account by using hospital 
fixed effects. Another point is the selection of relatively sick patients into high-
quality hospitals. This effect is studied by comparing the results between patients 
that are less subject to selection effects and other patients.  
3. Data 
The data used in this paper consist of two main data sets prepared by the 
California’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). The 
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first set is the Patient Discharge Data that includes all the discharge abstracts for 
all patients discharged from a Californian hospital from 1990 to 1998. Patients 
younger than 65 are excluded from the sample to obtain a relatively uniform 
sample of Medicare beneficiaries. The variables include patients’ basic 
characteristics like age, gender and race, length-of-stay, severity of the disease, the 
diagnosed conditions and procedures used for treatment. Severity of illness is 
defined in four levels (extreme, major, moderate, and minor) according to APR-
DRG (All Patient Refined Diagnosis-Related Group) classification. This severity 
measure and its validity are discussed later in this section.  
The second data set is the California’s Hospitals Disclosure Data (CADD) 
from 1989 to 1998. This data set consists of the information obtained from the 
hospital financial reports submitted annually to the Department of Health Services. 
All non-federal hospitals are required report. Hospital characteristics like 
ownership status, size (number of beds) and type of the hospital are extracted from 
this data set. Spetz et al (1999, 2000) and Mitchell et al. (2001) report that the 
ownership information reported in CADD has a lot of reporting errors. The main 
problems are non-standard reporting periods, multiple reports in a single year and 
late reporting or failure to report ownership changes. This data set is corrected 
using the information reported in the appendix of Spetz et al (1999) along with 
other corrections using Internet sources and a few direct contacts with hospitals.5 
The status changes in private hospitals are completely checked and corrected. In 
order to avoid the potential errors related to the conversions of public hospitals, I 
exclude all hospitals that were public at least for one year within the sample 
period.  In the analyses reported in this paper the unit of observation is a hospital-
year with the year being the fiscal year beginning June 30th.6 The patient-level data 
are merged with hospital characteristics using the admission month and year for 
each patient.  
Conversions 
The changes in California’s acute-care7 hospital market share in private FP, 
private NFP, and public sectors between 1989-90 and 1997-98 are given in table 1. 
The changes in the number of hospitals in each sector and the average hospital size 
in terms of available beds are also given. These numbers suggest that during this 
period, public and FP hospitals became fewer but larger. While the number of 
                                                          
5 See Currie et al. (2002) for more details about the corrections in the data. 
6 This is the OSHPD’s fiscal year and the most frequent reporting period in the data. For the cases where 
the reporting period does not match with the fiscal year, the data are arranged such that every report is 
considered in the fiscal year that covered the largest part of the reporting period. In the hospital-years with 
multiple reports, a single observation is created using the weighted average over the reports (weights being 
the reporting period). In cases where conversion in status is in a multiple-report year, the new (old) status is 
considered if the conversion occurred in the first (second) half of the fiscal year. 
7 By acute-care hospitals I mean all non-psychiatric hospitals that reported inpatient care. Rehabilitation 
centers are also excluded. 
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NFP hospitals increased, their size remained practically unchanged.8 The total 
number of acute-care hospitals decreased from 462 hospitals in 1989-90 to 410 
hospitals in 1997-98. The NFP sector is however much less affected by this 
consolidation trend. As we will see later, conversions are responsible for part of 
these asymmetrical changes across different sectors.  
The data show three major types of conversion: FP to NFP, NFP to FP, and 
public to NFP. There are only a few conversions in other directions. Between 1990 
and 1998, 11 hospitals converted from FP to NFP form, while 15 NFP hospitals 
became FP.  At the same period 14 hospitals converted from public to NFP status. 
Among more than 500 acute-care hospitals that have operated in California, about 
56 hospitals had at least one conversion during this period. These hospitals on 
average, account for about 13% of hospital beds in California. Table 2 gives the 
distribution of conversions between FP and NFP status over time. The number of 
hospitals and hospital beds are both given. As suggested by these numbers, the 
conversions are spread over the nine years and do not show any clear temporal 
pattern.  
The variations in the size of the converted hospitals (given in table 2) 
suggest that among both FP and NFP hospitals, the relatively large institutions are 
more likely to convert in ownership status. However, given that hospital capacity 
is an endogenous parameter that can change with conversions, it is not included in 
the model.9 Other hospital characteristics that do not change with conversion, are 
captured by hospital fixed effects.10 Market-specific characteristics are not 
considered in the analysis. First, because the time-invariant and general time 
trends in market characteristics are respectively captured by the hospital fixed 
effects and year dummies, and the immediate effect of conversions on market 
shares does not seem to be significant.11 Secondly, the market share of FP 
hospitals in California remained almost constant over the study period.  
Patient-level data 
Hospitalizations of California’s elderly patients for the following two 
diagnostic categories have been chosen: acute myocardial infarction (AMI), and 
                                                          
8 According to the data the average capacity of the NFP hospitals increased gradually from 217 beds in 
1989-90 to 227 in 1993-94 and then decreased to 217 beds in 1997-98. 
9 My regressions (not shown in the paper) suggest that converted hospitals may change their capacity. 
However, including the number of beds in the regressions does not change the results of the paper. 
10 For instance, Keeler et al (1992) found that among all hospital characteristics, the involvement in 
teaching activities has the most significant effect on their quality measures. However, there is no 
association between conversions and teaching status in our sample. In fact there are only two FP hospitals 
that have teaching status, one of which is a non-converting hospital and the other has converted from NFP 
status, but kept its teaching affiliations after conversion. 
11 My preliminary analyses (not reported here) show that an approximately constructed Herfindahl index 
based on county borders has no significant effect in mortality regressions as long as hospital fixed effects 
and year dummies are controlled for. 
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congestive heart failure (CHF).12 In each case the sample contains all the patients 
of 65 years of age and older13, hospitalized with the corresponding condition as 
principal diagnosis.14 Elderly patients provide relatively more homogeneous 
samples not only regarding age-related risk factors, but also because of a single 
insurance coverage by Medicare.  
 The choice of diagnoses is also based on the variety of treatment methods 
available. One can expect a higher variation in hospital quality for cardiac diseases 
whose treatment is chosen from a relatively wide range of procedures. There has 
been a great amount of innovation in the treatment of cardiac diseases in general 
and CHF in particular (Braunwald and Bristow, 2000). Since the main measure of 
quality is based on the in-hospital mortality, the diagnoses are chosen from the 
most important causes of death. According to the California mortality data, AMI 
and CHF are ranked among the most deadly diseases in California and throughout 
the US.15 
 Table 3 gives the distribution of the patients and a descriptive summary of 
some of the features of hospitalizations by sector. The size of the samples varies 
from about 252,000 for the AMI group to 486,000 for CHF patients. NFP hospitals 
have the largest share (about 80 percent) of hospitalizations in private hospitals. 
FP hospitals have the highest mortality rate and the most severely ill cases 
(according to reported APR-DRG classification) in AMI sample and the lowest 
mortality and least severe case-mix in CHF group. These numbers also indicate 
that FP hospitals attract older patients. NFP hospitals have the highest rate of ER 
admissions and the longest hospitalizations.  
 The selection patterns observed in table 3, suggest that an unbiased 
estimation of ownership effects requires controlling for severity variations across 
hospitals. The risk factors considered in this paper include demographic covariates 
like age, gender, race (black/non-black), and ethnicity (Asian and Hispanic 
groups). Age is considered as five age groups: 65 years to 69, 70 to 74, 75 to 79, 
80 to 84, and 85 and older. I also control for the interaction terms of race and 
gender with age groups. Moreover, a severity index is constructed for every 
patient based on the APR-DRG classification.16 Finally, in the case of CHF sample 
                                                          
12 Four other diagnostic groups, malignant lung cancer, hypertensive heart disease, diabetes mellitus, and 
hospitalizations due to motor vehicle traffic accidents, were also studied using a similar methodology. 
However, these samples did not show any significant ownership effects, and are excluded from the paper to 
avoid unnecessary repetition. 
13 I exclude a few patients older than 99 years.  
14 The corresponding codes according to the International Classification of Diseases, 9th version, Clinical 
Modification (U.S. Departmnet of Health and Human Services) are as follows: AMI: 410.xx, CHF: 428.0, 
402.x1, 398.91, 404.x1, and 404.x3.  
15 US Vital Statistics Mortality: multiple cause-of-death summary (1968-98), National Center for Health 
Statistics. 
16 APR-DRG is a system of classification of diseases with severity categories, patented by 3M Health 
Information Systems. This severity measure is not available for most of the discharges that occurred in 
1990 and 1991. APR-DRG system defines the severity as the "extent of physiologic decompensation or 
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where the diagnosis consists of four main categories, these categories are 
identified according to the first three digits of the principal diagnosis ICD-9-CM 
code and are taken into account using three binary indicators. 
The APR-DRG measure of severity has been shown to be a powerful 
predictor of mortality.17 However, this measure is not directly used as a risk-
adjustment factor. First, since it includes all the relevant diagnoses reported at 
discharge, regardless of whether they are developed before or after admission, it 
may include some “preventable” complications as well as “natural” comorbidities. 
Secondly, given that the Medicare reimbursement system is based on the patient’s 
diagnosis group, hospitals have an incentive to over-report complications.18 This 
problem, known as upcoding or DRG creep, may occur differently among 
hospitals with different ownership status.19 In this paper, a severity index based on 
the APR-DRG classification is used. This index measures the difference between 
the APR-DRG severity measure of the patient and the average severity of patients 
within the same hospital-year-diagnosis group. Since this measure only represents 
the variation within hospital-year, differential upcoding cannot create any bias in 
the estimation of ownership effects. 
Measures of quality 
One of the most commonly used outcome measures of quality is the risk-
adjusted in-hospital mortality. There are several validation studies suggesting that 
adjusted mortality rates can be used as a measure of hospital quality. Thomas et al. 
(1993) studied the in-hospital mortality rates for ten diagnostic groups of patients 
separately. For many but not all of these groups, the results showed a significant 
relationship between risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality and the hospital's quality 
as evaluated by peer reviews based on explicit and implicit process criteria. The 
strongest evidence of validity was obtained for cardiac diseases, which may 
suggest less selection for this kind of patients. Kahn et al. (1990) found similar 
results using mortality rates 30 days after admission. Significant relationship of 
risk-adjusted 30-day mortality and several process measures of quality was found 
in four out of five examined conditions. 
Based upon these studies, the risk-adjusted in-hospital mortality probability 
is adopted as the main measure of quality in this paper. Like most other health 
outcomes that potentially have some information about hospital quality, mortality 
                                                                                                                                                                             
organ system loss of function". Using information like principal diagnoses, procedures, multiple 
comorbidities, and age, it provides four severity-of-illness and risk-of-mortality subclasses within each 
DRG (Diagnosis-Related Group). See www.3Mhis.com and the 3M’s APR-DRG Software’s brochure. 
17 See Romano and Chan (2000) for evidence regarding AMI patients. 
18 For instance, Medicare reimbursements increase about 40% if an AMI patient has CHF complication 
(Psaty et al., 1999). Silverman and Skinner (2001) and Psaty et al. (1999) provide some evidence of over-
reporting the severity of illness by hospitals. See also Foundation for Health Care Quality (1997) section 2. 
19 Studying Medicare inpatient claims between 1989 and 1997 for pneumonia patients, Silverman and 
Skinner (2001) provide evidence suggesting that upcoding is more common among FP hospitals and also 
those NFP hospitals that converted to FP type. 
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is a rare outcome and sometimes takes a long time to manifest, making its 
measurement difficult. Especially since the hospitals have some discretion on 
discharging the patients, the differences in hospitals’ discharge/transfer policies 
may distort the in-hospital mortality from the “real” mortality risk. However, this 
issue seems to be relatively insignificant for cardiac diseases, which generally 
show a high correlation between in-hospital and long-term mortality. For instance, 
Rosenthal et al. (2000) find a strong correlation between 30-day (post-admission) 
mortality rates and in-hospital death rates for a sample of 13,800 CHF patients. 
They also provide evidence that the small differences in hospitals ranking caused 
by replacing in-hospital death rates by 30-day mortality rates are not resulted from 
the differences in hospital discharge practices.  
As the numbers in table 3 indicate, the selected diagnoses have relatively 
high in-hospital death rates. Moreover in both groups, a relatively large part of 
deaths occur in acute-care hospitals. For instance during 1998 in California, 29.1% 
of 17,422 deaths caused by AMI and more than half of deaths caused by CHF 
occurred in short-term hospitals. However, these arguments are not perfectly 
satisfying. I therefore study the robustness of the results to potential differences in 
discharge and transfer practices across hospitals. This issue is discussed in more 
detail later. 
Another outcome measure used in this paper is the risk-adjusted probability 
of early readmission of AMI patients following discharge from a hospital. Usually 
readmission within a short period (typically one month) after an initial discharge is 
considered as an undesired outcome that could be avoided by the original provider 
(Thomas and Holloway, (1991) and Carey and Burgess (1999)). In some cases 
readmission within longer periods of time was used as an indicator of poor quality 
(Cutler, 1995). However, most of preventable readmissions occur within 10 days 
of a previous discharge (Frankl et al, 1991). Several authors have found that the 
variations in readmission probability are related to patient’s clinical conditions 
rather than hospital quality (Thomas and Holloway (1991), Thomas (1996), and 
Ludke et al. (1993)). However, a readmission for an AMI patient may imply 
another heart attack, thus a significant increase in patient’s mortality risk. The re-
admission measure used in this paper is based on unscheduled re-hospitalizations 
with AMI as the principal diagnosis within one, two and three months after an 
initial discharge.20 
4. Methods 
The empirical model used in this paper can be formulated as follows: 
  m Xijt ijt jt t j ijtZ Yβ γ τ λ= + + + +ε
                                                          
  (1) 
20 I also considered re-admissions within six month. The results with were very similar and therefore not 
reported. 
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where mijt is the quality indicator of patient i hospitalized in hospital j in year t. 
The quality indicators are binary variables representing the patient’s mortality 
outcome, whether the patient was readmitted after discharge, or whether certain 
procedures were used during the hospitalization.  
Xijt is the vector of patient’s characteristics including age groups, gender, 
race and their pair-wise interactions. This vector also includes a constructed 
severity index as defined in the previous section, as well as three additional 
dummies for CHF sample, which represent its main diagnostic sub-categories. Zjt 
is the vector of hospital status. This vector includes a series of conversion 
indicators that represent the state of hospital with respect to the conversion year. 
These variables will be explained in each case. Yt is the vector of year dummies 
and λj is the hospital-specific fixed effect. Finally εijt represents an i.i.d. random 
error that represents the unobserved heterogeneities among patients, hospitals, and 
years.  
Since the effect of risk factors differs across different health conditions, 
equation (1) is estimated separately in the two diagnostic groups. The standard 
errors are corrected for the correlation of errors within hospital-year groups.21 The 
least squares method is used to estimate the model.22 This method may seem 
inconsistent with the dichotomous dependent variable. However, it should be 
noted that insofar as hospital-level effects are concerned, the model in equation (1) 
can be integrated to an equivalent hospital-level model. The dependent variable 
can thus be considered as an aggregate hospital-specific mortality probability.23 
Patient selection 
Patient level data can be used to estimate hospital-specific measures of 
quality. However, these measures are affected by a variety of confounding factors 
such as caseload characteristics. Patients with different severity may favor 
hospitals in one sector over another. Hospitals may also have different incentives 
in targeting certain groups of patients or avoiding “costly” patients to make more 
profits. An unbiased estimation of ownership effects on hospital performance 
requires a sufficient adjustment for the unobserved risk factors that potentially 
vary across different sectors.  
                                                          
21 This correction is done by clustering the sample in hospital-year groups. In this method the errors can be 
correlated within clusters. Consequently, the variations within clusters contribute little to the estimation 
precision. The standard errors are therefore more realistic than those obtained with the independence 
assumption, which may be under-estimated. See Moulton (1990) for an illustration of the downward bias in 
standard errors in grouped data and Rogers (1993) for more details on clustering technique. Our estimations 
show however that clustering does not change the estimated standard errors much. This result is consistent 
with Moulton’s contention that the problem does not arise in a fixed effects model (see Moulton (1986)). 
22 The advantage of the least square method (compared to Logit or Probit) is in that no distribution 
assumption is imposed on the error term. 
23 Note that the usual heteroscedasticity of OLS estimators with dichotomous dependent variables does not 
arise here because the errors are clustered within hospital-year groups and the errors across groups do not 
have a dichotomous nature. 
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 To the extent that patients go to the closest hospital and hospital location 
does not change with ownership, hospital fixed effects (λj) can help to avoid 
selection effects. The emergency nature of diagnoses like AMI can help in this 
regard. Similarly, patients admitted through ER may be less affected by selection. 
Comparing the results between such patients and the whole sample and also across 
the two diagnostic groups can help identify the direction of such biases.  
 There is a possibility that certain types of hospitals get rid of their sickest 
patients by premature discharges or transfers to other hospitals. In this case the 
mortality rates of such hospitals will be biased downward. But controlling for the 
length of hospital stays reduces this bias. Comparing specifications with and 
without controlling for the hospital stay allows to understand if the mortality 
differences are resulted from different lengths of hospitalization. For instance, 
suppose that high-quality hospitals, say NFP ones, have systematically longer 
hospitalizations for risky patients. In this case these hospitals’ mortality will be 
biased upward if the length-of-stay is not taken into account. On the other hand, 
since the length-of-stay is endogenous, controlling for it will result in an 
endogeneity bias resulting an underestimation of the mortality in NFP hospitals. 
The two specifications can therefore provide upper and lower bounds of the 
potential bias associated with differences in hospital stay.  
Pre- and post-conversion effects 
The first hypothesis studied in this paper posits that NFP status is inherently 
associated with a relatively high quality of service. In this case the quality rises 
after conversion from FP to NFP and deteriorates at a similar amount because of 
conversion from NFP to FP form. This symmetry assumption can be tested by 
comparing conversions in opposite directions. In order to study this issue two 
binary indicators representing post-conversion states for the two types of 
conversion are introduced in the model in equation (1). Under the symmetry 
hypothesis the coefficients of these indicators must be opposite but similar in 
absolute value.  
Another important question concerns the quality changes prior to 
conversion. Conversions are mostly a consequence of the sale of the hospital to a 
new owner. Such decisions are usually taken a few years before the actual 
transactions occur. One can therefore expect that the converted hospitals go 
through some changes before conversion, which may affect the hospital quality. 
For instance, a hospital that is subject to financial problems and perhaps to a 
deteriorating quality is more likely to be taken over by other firms and eventually 
convert to another status. In this case if the pre-conversion effects are not taken 
into account, the estimations may suggest that the quality has actually fallen after 
the conversion even though the hospital may have actually improved.  In order to 
control for potential changes in quality prior to conversion, two linear trends are 
introduced in the model: one for FP to NFP conversion and one for NFP to FP 
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conversions. These variables represent the number of years before the 
corresponding conversion for each hospital. They are set to zero for the conversion 
year and all the following years and also for the hospitals that did not convert, and 
they take negative values for the years before conversion. Therefore, these trends 
capture the annual change in mortality before conversion.24 The changes after 
conversion are represented by the two post-conversion indicators.  
5. Results 
Mortality and patient selection 
 Table 4 gives the estimated effects of ownership status on the in-hospital 
mortality. The first column gives the regression results without control for 
severity. These results suggest that FP status is associated with lower mortality 
rates for CHF patients. The difference is however insignificant for AMI patients. 
The results in column II show that controlling for severity deviation within 
hospital-year groups does not change the results. However as expected, the 
constructed measure of relative severity has a positive effect on mortality and the 
model’s explanatory power increases (reflected in a significant increase in the R-
square).  The estimation results with control for the length-of-stay are listed in 
column III. These results indicate that including the length-of-stay does not change 
the results significantly, suggesting that the results are not driven by systematic 
differences in hospitals’ discharge practices. The results show that the length-of-
stay has a negative effect on mortality among AMI patients but a positive effect on 
the CHF mortality. The negative effect is consistent with our contention that 
hospitals may affect the apparent mortality rates by early discharges. The results 
suggest however, that the length-of-stay may represent at least for CHF patients, 
part of the unobserved severity of illness. 
 Columns IV to VI list the estimation results for the patients admitted 
through ER. These numbers indicate that restricting both samples to ER 
admissions results in an increase in the estimated mortality of NFP hospitals. This 
pattern can be explained by weaker selection effects for ER patients, suggesting 
that unobserved severity differences are more likely to create a downward bias for 
the NFP hospitals’ mortality. According to this interpretation, the CHF sample 
should give a lower mortality for NFP hospitals because, compared to AMI 
patients, this group is more affected by election bias. This prediction is only 
partially confirmed by the results of the ER samples. However, the results of table 
4 generally show that the estimated effect of ownership status is more or less 
                                                          
24  One can argue however that these changes may be of an arbitrary non-linear form. I added the squares of 
these trends to the model. None of the second-order terms showed any significant effect. I also tried an 
alternative with 8 year dummies for any specific year before conversion. However, because of the large 
number of variables and relatively small number of observations in each group, virtually all the coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. 
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similar across different samples, suggesting that after controlling for hospital fixed 
effects the selection bias is relatively limited. 
 The results generally reject the hypothesis that NFP hospitals have a higher 
quality with respect to the mortality outcomes of the studied diagnoses. Rather, 
they provide suggestive evidence that FP status may be associated with lower in-
hospital mortality rates for converted hospitals. However, it should be noted that 
these estimations are based on the implicit assumption that different institutional 
forms have inherent quality characteristics. As it will be clear later this assumption 
may be unrealistic. 
Changes before and after conversion 
Table 5 lists the estimation results of mortality regressions controlling for 
the potential pre- and post-conversion effects. As it can be seen in columns I and 
IV, the symmetry hypothesis is strongly rejected. Interestingly, both AMI and CHF 
samples suggest that a conversion from NFP to FP does not have any significant 
effect on mortality whereas a FP to NFP conversion results in a significant 
increase in mortality incidence. These results may reflect at least partially, the pre-
conversion changes. The results listed in column II show that after controlling for 
a linear trend in mortality before conversion, the results are reversed suggesting 
that conversion to FP status raises the mortality of AMI patients. This result is 
consistent with Shen (2002)’s findings that the conversions to FP status resulted in 
an increase in the mortality incidence of AMI patients.25 The results in column II 
also suggest the hospitals that converted from FP to NFP form have experienced a 
gradual increase in AMI mortality before conversion.  
The results of CHF sample (column V) suggest however, that controlling 
for pre-conversion changes does not change the initial estimation results (column 
IV). The results in columns III and VI indicate that controlling for the length-of-
stay does not change the estimation results, suggesting that the estimated changes 
are not driven by different discharge/transfer practices. The results in table 5 point 
to two important general shortcomings in the analysis of hospital quality and 
conversions. First, the changes in hospital quality before conversion are crucial. 
The results may be completely misleading if these changes are not taken into 
account. Secondly, the quality measures depend on the adopted diagnosis. 
Hospital quality has therefore several dimensions that may vary independently.   
Re-admission rates 
The probability of readmission among AMI patients is analyzed using re-
hospitalization with AMI as a principal diagnosis within 1, 2, and 3 months after 
an initial discharge. The estimation results are given in table 6. These results 
suggest that patients admitted to hospitals that converted to NFP status are more 
                                                          
25 Shen (2002) used a national sample including 300 hospitals that changed ownership between 1985 and 
1996.  
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likely to be re-hospitalized after an initial treatment. The very low values of R-
square indicate however, that the re-admission probabilities are influenced by a 
relatively large number of unobserved factors. Hospitals that converted to FP 
status show a similar change but the effects are statistically insignificant in most 
cases. The effect of severity measure is as expected positive. 
6. Conclusions 
Between 1990 and 1998 California has witnessed 11 conversions from FP to 
NFP status and 15 conversions from NFP to FP form. Both types of conversions 
are found to have adverse effects on the quality of care in converted hospitals. 
Hospitals converted to FP status show a significant increase in the in-hospital 
mortality of their elderly AMI patients. On the other hand, hospitals converted to 
NFP form have experienced an increase in the mortality incidence of their CHF 
patients and in the re-admission probability of patients treated for AMI. These 
estimates are obtained from models that control for possible selection biases by 
including hospital fixed effects and controlling for the relative severity of patients’ 
illnesses. The results appear to be robust to potential differences between hospital 
types regarding discharge and transfer practices and also to the possible quality 
changes prior to conversions.  
This study provides some evidence that the converted hospitals may be subject 
to quality changes before conversion. Controlling for these changes is crucial for 
an unbiased estimation of conversion effects. While the results suggest that some 
of the public concern over conversions to FP form may be warranted, this paper’s 
general conclusion is that hospital quality is a complex multi-dimensional concept, 
which is unlikely to be uniformly affected by hospital ownership status. The 
observed changes after conversions are not consistent with the contention that a 
particular institutional form is equivalent to a high commitment to quality. 
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Table 1- Share of California acute-care hospitals by sector in 1990 and 1998 
 Year FP NFP Public 
1989-90 20.3 63.3 16.4 Share of hospital 
beds (%) 1997-98 20.5 64.8 14.6 
1989-90 134 238 90 Number of 
hospitals 1997-98 107 233 70 
1989-90 124 217 148 Average size 
(number of beds) 1997-98 150 217 163 
 
 
Table 2- Conversions in California acute-care hospitals between FP and NFP forms 
   Fiscal year starting from the end of June 
 Total Size 90-91 91-92 92-93 93-94 94-95 95-96 96-97 97-98 
FP to NFP 11 (1672) 152 0 
4 
(533) 
2 
(218) 
1 
(162) 
1 
(274) 
1 
(118) 
1 
(230) 
1 
(137) 
NFP to FP 15 (3480) 232 0 
2 
(262) 0 
3 
(191) 0 
2 
(279) 
4 
(1535) 
4 
(1213) 
 
-   Total number of beds is given in brackets. Hospital size is considered as the average number of beds. 
 
 
Table 3- Descriptive summary of hospitalizations in private acute-care hospitals 
 
Diagnostic group: AMI CHF 
Number of admissions: 249,332 482,235 
For-Profit 17.8 21.0 Distribution of 
admissions (%): Not-For-Profit 82.2 79.0 
For-Profit 14.5 5.5 
Not-For-Profit 13.1 5.9 
1990 15.9 7.34 
1998 11.4 4.75 
Average in-hospital 
death rate (%) by status 
and year: 
Overall 13.3 5.79 
For-Profit 76.2 78.7 
Not-For-Profit 76.0 78.4 Average age (years): 
Overall 76.0 78.5 
For-Profit 46.7 37.3 
Not-For-Profit 45.2 38.0 
Percent of patients with 
extreme or major 
severity categories: Overall 45.5 37.8 
For-Profit 69.0 60.3 
Not-For-Profit 70.5 67.9 Percent of admissions through ER: 
Overall 70.2 66.3 
For-Profit 5.97 5.52 
Not-For-Profit 6.39 5.62 Average length-of-stay (days): 
Overall 6.31 5.60 
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Table 4- Mortality regressions  
 
Entire Sample Patients Admitted through ER 
 
I II III IV V VI 
Not-for-
profit 
.0054 
(.0071) 
.0063 
(.0072) 
.0085 
(.0074) 
.011 
(.0074) 
.013* 
(.007) 
.016** 
(.008) 
Severity 
deviation _ 
.130** 
(.001) 
.153** 
(.001) _ 
.139** 
(.001) 
.164** 
(.0015) 
Length-of-
stay (days) _ _ 
-.012** 
(.0004) _ _ 
-.015** 
(.0005) 
R2 .031 .128 .167 .031 .132 .183 
A
cu
te
 M
yo
ca
rd
ia
l I
nf
ar
ct
io
n 
Sample size 249,332 hospitalizations 1,522 hospital-years 
175,550 hospitalizations 
1,423 hospital years 
Not-for-
profit 
.0064** 
(.0032) 
.0064** 
(.0031) 
.0063** 
(.0032) 
.011** 
(.004) 
.011** 
(.004) 
.0105** 
(.004) 
Severity 
deviation _ 
.074** 
(.001) 
.073** 
(.0009) _ 
.075** 
(.001) 
.074** 
(.001) 
Length-of-
stay (days) _ _ 
.00053** 
(.0001) _ _ 
.00051** 
(.0001) 
R2 .013 .056 .056 .010 .056 .056 
C
on
ge
st
iv
e 
H
ea
rt 
Fa
ilu
re
 
Sample size 482,235 hospitalizations  1,537 hospital-years 
319,758 hospitalizations  
1,434 hospital-years 
 
- For-Profit status is considered as base line (coefficient zero).  
- Standard errors are given in brackets. 
- ** indicates significant at 5% level. 
- * indicates significant at 10% level. 
- Standard errors are clustered in hospital-year groups. 
- Hospital fixed effects, year dummies and patients demographics (5 age groups, gender, race and interaction of 
age groups with race and gender dummies) are included in the model but not shown in the table. 
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Table 5- Mortality regressions with pre- and post-conversion indicators 
 
Acute Myocardial Infarction Congestive Heart Failure 
 
I II III IV V VI 
Converted from 
NFP to FP 
.0088 
(.0074) 
.019* 
(.010) 
.018* 
(.010) 
-.0004 
(.0040) 
-.0005 
(.0049) 
-.0004 
(.0049) 
Converted from 
FP to NFP 
.025** 
(.012) 
.0074 
(.011) 
.0070 
(.011) 
.015** 
(.0047) 
.018** 
(.0055) 
.018** 
(.0055) 
Time trend before 
NFP to FP 
conversion 
_ -.0028 (.0018) 
-.0027 
(.0018) _ 
-.000006 
(.0008) 
-.00002 
(.0008) 
Time trend before 
FP to NFP 
conversion 
_ .0064** (.0023) 
.0083** 
(.0030) _ 
-.0012 
(.0012) 
-.0013 
(.0012) 
Severity 
deviation 
.13** 
(.0012) 
.13** 
(.0012) 
.15** 
(.0014) 
.074** 
(.0009) 
.0074** 
(.0009) 
.0073** 
(.0009) 
Length-of-stay 
(days) _ _ 
-.012** 
(.0004) _ _ 
.00053** 
(.0001) 
R-square .128 .128 .167 .0560 .0560 .0563 
Sample size 249,332 hospitalizations 1,522 hospital-years 
482,235 hospitalizations 
1,537 hospital-years 
 
- Standard errors are given in brackets. 
- ** indicates significant at 5% level. 
- * indicates significant at 10% level. 
- Standard errors are clustered in hospital-year groups. 
- The time trends are compared to the conversion year for each hospital. 
- Hospital fixed effects, year dummies and patients demographics (5 age groups, gender, race and interaction of 
age groups with race and gender dummies) are included in the model but not shown in the table. 
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Table 6- Readmission of AMI patients 
 
Readmission 
within: 1 month 2 months 3 months 
 I II III IV V VI 
Converted from 
NFP to FP 
.0046 
(.0039) 
.0035 
(.0059) 
.0066 
(.0055) 
.0044 
(.0078) 
.011* 
(.0066) 
.012 
(.0078) 
Converted from 
FP to NFP 
.014** 
(.0065) 
.014* 
(.0076) 
.014* 
(.0065) 
.016** 
(.0081) 
.013* 
(.0073) 
.017* 
(.0088) 
Time trend before 
NFP to FP 
conversion 
_ .0003 (.0012) _ 
.0007 
(.0013) _ 
-.00008 
(.0015) 
Time trend before 
FP to NFP 
conversion 
_ -.00003 (.0009) _ 
-.0007 
(.0012) _ 
-.0014 
(.0013) 
Severity 
deviation 
.0013** 
(.0005) 
.0012** 
(.0005) 
.0026** 
(.0006) 
.0026** 
(.0006) 
.0024** 
(.0006) 
.0024** 
(.0006) 
R-square .0100 .0100 .0097 .0097 .0096 .0096 
Average re-admission rates: 
FP hospitals 4.5% 5.7% 6.4% 
NFP hospitals 3.4% 4.6% 5.4% 
Overall 3.6% 4.8% 5.6% 
 
- The sample includes 202,864 observations (1,503 hospital-years) consisting of AMI elderly patients with valid 
ID who were discharged alive after an initial hospitalization. 
- Standard errors are given in brackets. 
- ** indicates significant at 5% level. 
- * indicates significant at 10% level. 
- Standard errors are clustered in hospital-year groups. 
- The time trends are compared to the conversion year for each hospital. 
- Hospital fixed effects, year dummies and patients demographics (5 age groups, gender, race and interaction of 
age groups with race and gender dummies) are included in the model but not shown in the table. 
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